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Troubled Waters:
Federal Oversight of Offshore Oil
Drilling
Juliet Eilperin*
The oil seeping into the Gulf of Mexico in the aftermath of the
2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion was just the visible
manifestation of an uncomfortable fact: the United States lacks a
national energy policy. As a result, some of the most critical
energy decisions policymakers have undertaken in recent years
have been driven by a myriad of factors, ranging from short-term
political calculations to well-orchestrated lobbying campaigns.
And while the Obama administration is working to overhaul the
regulatory system that has governed offshore oil and gas drilling
for decades, it remains unclear how it will fulfill the competing
missions that have guided the program since its inception.
* Juliet Eilperin graduated in 1992 magna cum laude from Princeton
University, where she received a bachelor's in Politics with a certificate in
Latin American Studies. In March 1998 she joined The Washington Post as
its House of Representatives reporter, serving in that position for six years
before becoming the Post's national environmental reporter. She covered the
2008 presidential race while maintaining her environmental beat. In the
wake of the Deepwater Horizon explosion in April 2010, Ms. Eilperin wrote
several investigative pieces exposing the lack of federal oversight over
offshore drilling. In the spring of 2006, Rowman & Littlefield published her
first book, Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the House of
Representatives. In June 2011, Pantheon published Demon Fish: Travels
Through the Hidden World of Sharks, which has been featured on NPR's
"Weekend Edition Saturday" and in People, Smithsonian and Popular Science
magazines. In 2011, Ms. Eilperin was awarded the Peter Benchley Ocean
Award for Media.
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The Minerals Management Service (MMS) emerged out of a
drive for regulatory reform. Before it existed, the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) oversaw the collection of royalties from oil and gas
companies, based on how much they took from federal land and
offshore reserves.' But the program became mired in allegations
of fraud, and a panel appointed to investigate the problems
recommended that a new agency take over those duties as its
main mission.
James G. Watt, Ronald Reagan's first Interior Secretary,
created an agency in 1982 that went further than USGS's
mandate. It would not only lease tracts for exploration and collect
the government's share of oil and gas revenue, but would regulate
the industry as well. The agency was charged under law to "meet
the nation's energy needs," a mandate which established an
inherit conflict with competing goals such as safeguarding the
nation's coasts.
Even after its establishment of MMS, Watt moved to expand
the new agency's powers. William D. Bettenberg, one of the
agency's early directors, left his office in Reston one Friday
afternoon and returned Monday to learn that Watt was giving
MMS oversight of drilling operations in the Outer Continental
Shelf, a responsibility that had rested within another Interior
Department division, the Bureau of Land Management.
As he set up the agency, Bettenberg turned to the oil and gas
industry for guidance. "Sometimes we applied industry
standards," he says. "Many of the standards are good."
Bettenberg, who retired in 2005 after working for more than four
decades in Interior, wonders whether the agency could have done
more to regulate deep-sea drilling. "This recent spill has
prompted me to conclude I didn't ask enough questions," he says.
"I suspect people didn't keep up with technology."
One of the reasons technology became more complicated over
time is that-without making a conscious decision about it-
elected officials concentrated drilling in the gulf. The trend began
in 1981 when Watt proposed opening up the Pacific Outer
1. Juliet Eilperin & Scott Higham, Seeking Answers in MMS's Flawed
Culture, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2010/08/24/AR201008
2406771.html. Except as otherwise noted, this is the original source for all
quotes, statistics, and factual statements contained in this essay.
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Continental Shelf and Georges Bank off Massachusetts to drilling.
The House Appropriations Committee members whose districts
would be directly affected by the plan-Representatives Les
AuCoin (D-Ore.) and Silvio 0. Conte (R-Mass.)-blocked him.
They inserted a provision in a spending bill mandating that no
money could be used to lease exploratory tracts in central and
Northern California waters or the Georges Bank. Watt had no
choice but to back down.
Lawmakers continued to expand the moratorium, even after
Watt stepped down from his post. From 1982 to 1992, the
territory declared off-limits grew from 700,000 acres off the
California coast to more than 266 million acres off the Pacific and
Atlantic coasts, Alaska's Bering Sea and the eastern Gulf of
Mexico.
George H.W. Bush went even further, saying during his 1988
presidential bid that offshore areas needed protection "until
technology moves forward." In his first year as president, he
canceled a slew of lease sales by executive order and established a
marine sanctuary in California's Monterey Bay. The government
also bought back leases for tracts off South Florida. The result:
more offshore auctions were canceled than held between 1987 and
1992.
The gulf remained the primary place for deepwater ventures.
At this point, it is home to ninety-nine percent of the nation's
offshore oil production.
Under the Clinton administration, regulators only grew closer
to the oil and gas drillers they oversaw. Bill Clinton appointed
Vice President Al Gore to oversee a "reinventing government"
initiative, which sought to cut the federal workforce, reduce
regulation and form "partnerships" between Washington and
industry. Profound changes would take place at MMS: It was
ordered to do a better job of collecting royalties, while losing
nearly ten percent of its staff during the next five years.
Reinvention also became the agency's mantra. In October
1993, an Interior panel issued findings aimed at future drilling
policies. Titled "Moving Beyond Conflict to Consensus," it
represented a paradigm shift. Chaired by an oil drilling company
executive, the panel urged a reversal of restrictions championed
during the previous decade by George H.W. Bush and many
members of Congress. It recommended that Interior lift the
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moratoriums, share revenue with states whose water would be
opened up for leasing, and create incentives to spur exploration,
such as royalty relief for industry. The panel called large spills in
the gulf "improbable," citing relatively low reservoir pressure that
required companies to retrieve the oil and gas through "artificial
lifting" in ninety percent of the wells.
With hindsight, Clinton's Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt
says he sees how policymakers came to focus more on revenue
than on risks. "This kind of partnership stuff, in a way, is an
inevitable part of a system in which you are producing the second-
largest amount of revenue for the U.S. government," he says. "It
was not a good decision. My belief, with considerable hindsight, is
there is no place for performance-based regulation because of the
high risk."
At the end of the Clinton administration, MMS itself issued a
warning. In a budget document, the agency reported in 2000 that
the burgeoning number of deepwater wells had made overseeing
operations in the gulf more complex. The number of companies
working there had grown by thirty percent and many employees
were new. MMS cautioned: "The offshore industry significantly
downsized in the 1980s.... The presence of workers without
offshore experience is placing an added burden on the inspection
and compliance program." The document attracted little notice.
Under George W. Bush's administration, the drive for energy
exploration intensified. Nine days after taking office Bush signed
an executive order creating the National Energy Policy
Development Group. As the task force's chair, Vice President
Richard B. Cheney held closed-door meetings with executives from
BP, Exxon-Mobil, Conoco, Shell and other firms. Jim Ford, then
director of federal relations for the American Petroleum Institute,
sent the panel an e-mail on March 20, 2001 outlining the
industry's legislative and policy wishes. He called for limiting
regulations, reducing the backlog of drilling permits, and making
it easier for energy companies to access oil and gas leases.
In its report on May 16, the task force said that drilling in the
Outer Continental Shelf had an "impressive environmental
record" and that state and federal regulations were interfering
with exploration and production. The panel urged Bush to direct
Interior Secretary Gale A. Norton to "consider economic
incentives" for oil and gas firms and reduce the amount of
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royalties they had to pay.
Soon after, Bush signed two executive orders that tracked
many points in Ford's e-mail and adopted many of the Cheney
panel's recommendations. MMS routinely exempted drilling
operations from detailed environmental reviews, and pressed
ahead with exploration activities.
Bush's Interior Secretary Gale Norton, and her deputy, J.
Steven Griles, embraced the task force's endorsement of more
drilling. A Griles memo to the White House's Council on
Environmental Quality on August 22, 2001, said Interior was
"fully committed to playing a role in this effort" and had a "special
interest and expertise" in expanding production.
During Norton's tenure, the department adopted regulations
aimed at spurring deepwater drilling in the western and central
Gulf of Mexico. A 2002 rule allowed oil and gas firms to apply for
additional royalty relief; two years later, another rule reduced
royalty payments for companies drilling for gas in deeper water.
At the time, MMS began receiving reports that raised
concerns about underwater blowout preventers, which serve as
the primary device for cutting off the flow of oil in an accident.
The equipment relies on a brute-force component known as a
blind-shear ram to sever and crimp the pipes of a runaway well.
These hydraulic-powered rams are the last line of defense against
the pressure rising from deepwater reservoirs, which had proved
greater than the members of the 1993 Interior panel had stated.
One study suggested requiring a second blind-shear ram for
backup, but in 2003, the agency decided against that. Another
report questioned whether remotely operated underwater vehicles
could generate enough pressure to cut the pipes. The agency did
little to address the concern.
In 2005, finalizing a policy from the end of the Clinton era,
MMS told companies that they did not have to provide detailed
blowout and response scenarios for each exploration plan. The
agency said the plans were "purely speculative or generic." MMS
officials did request modest budget increases for regulation. But
greater oversight was not a priority, as David Abraham at the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) discovered.
Abraham served as OMB's examiner for offshore programs
from 2003 to 2005. When he asked MMS officials about their
plans for keeping up with expanded drilling, he said they
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routinely gave the same answer. "They said, 'Our processes
work,"' recalls Abraham, now a fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations. "I said, 'It's like an airplane-everyone always says the
wheels will come down, but what happens when they don't?' They
should have had people who could say, 'This is what we do when
the wheels don't come down.' What they said is, 'Don't worry.
Our regulatory regime works."' Abraham recalls: "They were
being pushed by Congress, and they were being pushed by the
White House--'Let's go into this area, let's go into that area,'
Nobody asked: Did they have the technology" to handle this?
The pressure to increase production came from both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue, says Lynn Scarlett, who was Norton's
assistant secretary for policy, management and budget and then
deputy secretary under Norton's successor, Dirk Kempthorne.
"Those in favor of more drilling," she says, "were saying 'let's go
"gung ho" on deepwater. Lots of countries are doing it.' There
wasn't a parallel focus at the same time of, 'If we do this, let's
have a commensurate effort on regulations for safety."' Looking
back, Scarlett sees the problem not so much as one of complacency
but whether MMS "fully focused on the new challenges with
deepwater." She wonders: "Was there a failure of imagination of
what could happen given the new conditions?" Scarlett says that
question never reached her desk. "It just didn't come up," she
says. "I honestly didn't really think about it. I wish I had."
In September 2008, the once-obscure agency that provided
more money to the Treasury than nearly any other branch aside
from the Internal Revenue Service got a burst of negative
publicity. Interior's Inspector General released a report detailing
blatant corruption in the agency's office in Lakewood, Colorado,
which managed the royalty-in-kind program. Under the program,
MMS received a portion of the oil and gas collected by companies
and sold it on the market. While it was less time-consuming for
the industry that way, the probe showed MMS employees were not
only accepting improper gifts and trips from the business officials
they oversaw, but engaging in drug use and sexual relations with
them.
Right after the Obama administration took office in January
2009, the new Interior Secretary Ken Salazar informed reporters
he would clean up a firm that had grown too close to industry. He
delivered a sharply worded speech to Lakewood employees in
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which he promised a new code of conduct for the agency and
announced the end of the royalty-in-kind program following
evidence that millions of dollars in revenue had been lost. "The
public knows of what happened here in Lakewood," Salazar told
the quiet crowd. "The 'anything goes' will end. And this
department, and the Minerals Management Service, will lead the
way in ending it." But Salazar and his deputies became consumed
with other priorities, including promoting renewable energy on
public land and in federal waters. They did not have time to
overhaul MMS in the first year and-a-half of the administration.
The Deepwater Horizon explosion changed all that. On May
19, 2010, Salazar signed a secretarial order eliminating MMS and
replacing it with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).2  He placed Michael
Bromwich-a former Justice Department official known for
cleaning up troubled institutions, who was serving as a partner in
a prominent law firm in D.C.-as head of the agency.3  And
Salazar and Bromwich began to untangle the ties that
complicated MMS's mission for years.
Less than five months later, the administration announced
sweeping changes to its offshore drilling regulatory regime. The
Office of Natural Resources Revenue, which resides under the
Interior Department's Office of Policy, Management and Budget,
would oversee revenue collection.4 The remaining agency would
be split between the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM), charged with managing U.S. offshore resources, and the
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE),
2. Press Release, Kendra Barkoff, Deputy Commc'n Dir. & Press Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS's Three Conflicting Missions
(May 19, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-
Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions.cfm.
3. Press Release, Kendra Barkoff, Deputy Commc'n Dir. & Press Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Salazar Swears-In Michael R. Bromwich to Lead
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (June
21, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Swears
-In-Michael-R-Bromwich-to-Lead-Bureau-of-Ocean-Energy-Management-
Regulation-and-Enforcement-Secretarial-Order-begins-reorganization-of-
former-mms.cfm.
4. Press Release, Kendra Barkoff, Deputy Commc'n Dir. & Press Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Interior Establishes Office of Natural Resources
Revenue (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/
Interior-Establishes-Office-of-Natural-Resources-Revenue.cfm.
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charged with enforcing safety and environmental regulations.5
In announcing the change, Interior issued a press release
saying regulators would no longer be torn by the conflict of
overseeing the operations of the same firms they depended on for
revenue: "The reorganization of the former MMS is designed to
remove those conflicts by clarifying and separating missions
across three agencies and providing each of the new agencies with
clear missions and additional resources necessary to fulfill those
missions."6
Interior has issued a series of new rules aimed at preventing
future disasters, including requirements that operators
demonstrate that they are prepared to deal with the potential for
a blowout and worst-case discharge; that permit applications for
drilling projects meet new standards for well design, casing, and
cementing, and be independently certified by a professional
engineer; that offshore operators maintain comprehensive safety
and environmental programs; and that BOEMRE will begin to use
multiple-person inspection teams for offshore oil and gas
inspections.
BOEMRE is slowly beginning to approve deepwater drilling
operations in the gulf again. It still remains unclear what course
the Obama administration will pursue in the coming months, as it
navigates the tension between safeguarding the region's
environment and satisfying the nation's demand for natural
resources. But it has begun to reorient the way the nation
regulates offshore energy exploration in an effort to provide
clearer ground rules for those who plumb the depths of the ocean
and avoid tragedies like the one that illuminated the weaknesses
in a system that had endured for nearly three decades.
5. Id.
6. Press Release, Michael R. Bromwich, BOEMRE Director Discusses
Future of Offshore Renewable Energy at Offshore Wind Power Conference
(July 14, 2010), available at http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/2011/
press0201.htm.
